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Introduction
Since the 1970s international emergency management and 
policies have developed as a result of disasters in localities 
and countries, which often require a response ranging from 
localized to planned actions, through to major international 
humanitarian relief efforts with multi-agency coordination 
and collaboration. Tourists are frequently caught up in such 
events although research, outside the tourism field, has not 
generally identified this particular group of people as a major 
target group for emergency planning. Tourist well-being in 
times of crisis is often incorporated in the emergency plans 
of tour operators and governments to evacuate visitors in cri-
sis situations (e.g., the Tunisian terrorist attacks in 2015). 
This is in spite of the vulnerability of international visitors, 
who are away from their home area and have limited local 
knowledge of preparedness for likely eventualities as recog-
nized by Burby and Wagner (1996), depicting the vulnerabil-
ity of visitors to issues such as risks like terrorism (e.g., see 
Bowen, Fidgeon, and Page 2014; Fuchs and Reichel 2011; 
Israeli and Reichel 2003; Uriely, Maoz, and Reichel 2007). 
Although this is not a new issue within tourism research 
(e.g., Faulkner 2001; Faulkner and Vikulov 2001; Glaesser 
2003; Ritchie 2004), such research, with few exceptions, has 
made limited inroads into the policy arena to shape and 
impact upon policies to help both tourists and the wider visi-
tor economy in natural disasters. Recent studies of emergen-
cies, across specialist management journals, highlight the 
key challenges facing managers generically, but there is a 
dearth of research on the emergent field of study, “emer-
gency management and tourism,” since tourism academics, 
in the main, do not tend to be emergency management prac-
titioners, or policy makers. Therefore, a distinct gap exists 
within the extant tourism literature to focus on the concept of 
emergency management and its application to tourism, 
beyond the tendency of research to focus on specific crises to 
inform policy making.
In its simplest form, emergency management is about the 
way in which organizations respond to crises such as natural 
disasters, terrorism, outbreaks of disease such as pandemic 
influenza and Ebola, as well as unforeseen impacts on busi-
ness activities in destinations. Thus, emergency management 
tends to be involved in the development of policies and plans 
to cope with the expected as well as unexpected or unfore-
seen events.
Moreover, it is timely in this article to review the major 
contribution of this Journal’s previous research in this field 
and how it contributes to the development of emergency 
management and where these studies have assisted in the 
theoretical development of the subject area. In this article, 
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we adopt a holistic view of the area and argue that distinct 
management approaches have been developed and the main 
paradigm underpinning emergency management needs to be 
challenged as one outcome of this study. In historical terms, 
the field of emergency management has been covered empir-
ically in this journal since the early 1990s within discrete 
areas associated with crisis management (e.g., Mansfeld 
1999), risk (e.g., Roehl and Fesenmaier 1992), terrorism 
(e.g., Israeli and Reichel 2003; Leslie 1999), natural disas-
ters (e.g., Cahyanto and Pennington-Gray 2015), post-crisis 
recovery (Richter 1999), and only belatedly have a number 
of more theoretical papers begun to address the challenges of 
research in this field (e.g., von Bergner and Lohmann 2014). 
In this respect, this article not only synthesizes the research 
contributions since the 1990s in emergency management but 
adds to the theoretical development of a more holistic body 
of knowledge that we need to consider when approaching 
this field of study within tourism. Akin to other areas of tour-
ism research, these theoretical debates and developments are 
occurring through greater interdisciplinarity, and specifically 
in this article through the interconnections of management 
science, emergency management, scenario planning, and the 
empiricism of previous research studies in tourism.
This article also provides an important contribution to the 
theoretical literature on emergency planning and its applica-
tion to tourism, with a particular focus on identifying the roles 
and responsibilities of public and private sector agencies, to 
create the building-blocks needed for more effective models 
of national emergency management. Using a global survey of 
emergency stakeholders, it provides one of the first major 
studies of how managers view emergency management pro-
cesses when tourists are involved, drawing upon the expert 
knowledge of high-level stakeholders. This study extends the 
work of Kim (2014) around this notion of building-blocks as 
a mechanism to create effective management responses and 
draws upon emergency management and management sci-
ence to understand how best to protect the well-being of tour-
ists. Kim (2014) refers to emergency exercises as comprising 
three types: Discussion based (to develop awareness), Table 
Top (to test procedures and plan by developing scenarios), 
and Live Exercises (to test fully all aspects of disaster 
responses). In Kim’s study of how the United Kingdom 
planned, conducted, and learnt from disaster planning exer-
cises, the notion of building-blocks was employed to under-
stand how the involvement of stakeholders could be harnessed 
through collaboration. The study also highlighted the need for 
adaptability at the scene of an emergency. While Kim’s study 
was a national survey of emergency planning, in this study 
the focus is on a global analysis of one specific aspect—a 
Table Top exercise and its application to tourism. The main 
objective of the study is to understand what models of plan-
ning and management may be most appropriate to use in 
emergency situations involving tourists. The study challenges 
the conventional knowledge of emergency management, 
grounded in command and control models of emergency 
responses, by seeking to understand how new models of col-
laboration may help address potential disconnects between 
emergencies and the responses by multiple stakeholders.
The article commences with a discussion of the emergency 
management paradigm and its application to tourism. It then 
turns to the importance of a collaborative approach to emer-
gency management, contrasting it with the command and 
control model as a management tool. The article identifies the 
complexities of national emergency management and the 
theoretical analysis of human responses, suggesting that com-
plexity modeling in emergency planning, rather than over-
simplification, may help understand the etiology of disasters 
and how to respond over their life course. This challenges the 
existing paradigms of emergency management by arguing 
that the command and control model, which is widely applied 
in crisis situations to direct and manage activities, may not 
necessarily be the most appropriate management approach to 
employ. The natural corollary of this is that researchers and 
policy makers may need to create a framework that enables 
one to allocate responsibilities in an emergency setting. The 
next section presents an overview of the issues relating to the 
“collaboration versus command and control” approaches to 
emergency management. The article then moves on to explain 
the methodology employed in this study—the Delphi tech-
nique. The article draws upon the discussion of the results in 
relation to the research question and the implications of the 
findings, demonstrating the importance and relevance of allo-
cating responsibilities in order to maximize business resil-
ience. To structure the research reported in the article, the 
following research question is addressed:
•• What are the most appropriate models of emergency 
management that stakeholders consensually identify 
to safeguard the well-being of tourists?
Literature Review: Emergency 
Management and Its Application to 
Tourism
Petak (1985) highlighted the key challenges of emergency 
management—in anticipating the unexpected (even though 
we might expect a crisis, we may not know when and how it 
will unfold). In dealing with the unexpected, Petak (1985) 
noted that policy responses tend to group around four key 
areas—mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery—
and so any emergency will have a distinct etiology and life. 
Petak’s (1985) analysis of the remit of emergency manage-
ment has been expanded to include “resilience,” and Table 1 
highlights many of the terms used throughout this article, 
given the overlap and the tendency for multiple terms to be 
used within this field.
Emergency management has seen a significant growth in 
activity since the 1980s, with the 1990s identified by the 
United Nations General Assembly as the International 
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Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR), reflecting 
the growing interest in the evolving field of emergency man-
agement and planning. It is natural that emergency manage-
ment should take on a higher level of prominence as the 
world’s level of connectivity increases. McEntire (2004) 
argues that the focus on emergency management received an 
added impetus through the events of 9/11. These events were 
a catalyst for change, accelerating interest in emergency 
management and leading to the development of the Hyogo 
framework in 2005 (see Table 1; also see Sendai 2015). 
National emergency management in the 21st century now 
involves a myriad of stakeholders, advisers, and operational 
teams as a function spanning the public and private sectors, 
seemingly labeled crisis management and planning, business 
continuity, business resilience, and risk management. This 
specialist area of research tends to adopt a reflective case 
study methodology, focused on settings and the practices of 
emergency management. The result of these studies is a con-
sensus that there is growing complexity concerning not just 
the management but also with whom the responsibility of 
emergency management responses rests. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, it became mandatory for the public 
sector, as embodied in the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act (see 
Walker and Broderick 2006), to complete business continu-
ity plans to improve resilience. Despite the growth in this 
field of study, Smith (2012) argues that, irrespective of an 
organization’s best intentions, no one has complete control 
over its macro- or micro-environments, such as its supply 
chain. The implication here is that both public and private 
sectors need to have a business continuity planning approach 
that is able to accommodate different situations to ensure it 
can continue to operate in the face of adversity. Furthermore, 
the Hyogo framework in 2005 (also see Sendai 2015) has 
placed collaboration at the heart of its philosophy, recogniz-
ing that disasters or crises can affect everyone and therefore 
it is everyone’s business. This is the tenet of this article, argu-
ing that the collaboration paradigm is a particular challenge 
that practitioners face because of the fragmented nature of pri-
vate and public sector responsibilities (Sylves 2015). This is 
particularly noticeable in the field of tourism where ongoing 
debates around the question of “whose responsibility is tour-
ism safety and well-being?” largely remain unanswered, given 
the multiple levels of debate about who should be considering 
the transient population within areas, which can often exceed 
the volume of residents during the peak season. The result is a 
myriad of organizations having partial responsibility for visi-
tor well-being. In a destination setting, this means that it could 
be a combination of national or local emergency plans that 
include responsibility for visitors, with tour operators and the 
host governments of visitors often taking a lead role (often not 
coordinated with any local plans that may exist) to repatriate 
its citizens from immediate danger and threat to life.
Within the continuum of emergency incidents that may 
impact tourism destinations and businesses, it is recognized 
(e.g., Reiser 2003) that major incidents, although of high 
impact (e.g., an earthquake, terrorist incident, or other disas-
ter such as aircraft accident/ferry sinking), tend to be of low 
frequency with major consequences (i.e., multiple loss of 
life). Consequently, major bodies, responsible for interna-
tional tourists’ well-being, such as outbound tour operators, 
may have contingency plans for specific destinations when 
emergencies occur, such as the 2015 Tunisian terrorist attack 
where 3,000 UK tourists were evacuated. At a destination 
Table 1. Key Definitions in the Emergency Management and 
Planning Literature.
Terms Definitions
Business 
Continuity
“The capability of the organisation to continue 
delivery of products or services at acceptable 
predefined levels following a disruptive 
incident” (ISO 22301 and ISO 22313). This 
could mean an airport business staying 
operational after an electricity blackout as 
a result of terrorist attack by using its own 
generators.
Disaster “A serious disruption of the functioning of a 
community or a society involving widespread 
human, material, economic or environmental 
losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability 
of the affected community or society to cope 
using its own resources” (e.g., 9/11 and the 
Nepal Earthquake, 2015)
Hyogo 
Framework
“The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) is 
the key instrument for implementing disaster 
risk reduction, adopted by the Member 
States of the United Nations. Its overarching 
goal is to build resilience of nations and 
communities to disasters, by achieving 
substantive reduction of disaster losses by 
2015” (UNISDR 2007; Sendai 2015)
Emergency 
Management 
(also stated 
as disaster 
management)
“The organization and management of 
resources and responsibilities for addressing 
all aspects of emergencies, in particular 
preparedness, response and initial recovery 
steps. It involves plans and institutional 
arrangements to engage and guide the efforts 
of government, non-government, voluntary 
and private agencies in comprehensive and 
coordinated ways to respond to the entire 
spectrum of emergency needs” (UNISDR). 
An event covered by emergency management 
could be a terrorist attack or natural disaster.
Resilience “The ability of a system, community or 
society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, 
accommodate to and recover from the effects 
of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, 
including through the preservation and 
restoration of its essential basic structures 
and functions” (UNISDR). It offers an 
alternative to a sustainability program, which 
essentially means the ability to respond and 
recover from a shock.
Source: Developed from UNISDR (2015).
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level, work and expenditure on planning for, and mitigating 
the consequences of, emergencies has often been limited. 
One of the likely reasons for this is the fragmentation of 
responsibility, as there is often a disconnect between public 
sector agencies, as well as between public and private sector 
agents, due to the lack of formal communication and recog-
nition of responsibilities. In some cases, the public sector and 
private sector may be working on opposite agendas during a 
disaster, where the public sector is expressing the magnitude 
of the disaster in a way that may optimize its international 
support while the private sector may be trying to minimize 
the apparent magnitude of the emergency to maintain some 
semblance of business as usual (i.e., business continuity). 
Disconnection between parties affects the flow of informa-
tion through poor communication, which can hinder the 
coordination between parties that, in turn, affects the speed, 
efficiency, and effectiveness of emergency management and 
response. Such a “disconnect” tends to fracture information, 
communication, and coordination and lead to less than effec-
tive responses and actions. Therefore, a clear research gap 
exists in seeking to understand how to overcome this discon-
nect, given the impact it can have on human life and busi-
nesses. These issues can also affect destination reputations 
when major emergencies occur and organization and 
responses are deemed to be weak or lacking coordination. 
With the collaboration paradigm also being a new research 
focus, this study is both timely and relevant in looking at 
ways to address the emergency management disconnect. 
With the effect of 24-hour media coverage, including social 
media, the failure to provide a timely response during emer-
gency situations means that the issue is on the world stage in 
full media view and reputational damage is possible.
Understanding the Development of Emergency 
Management and Planning: The Role of 
Collaboration
The notion of a command and control approach to national 
emergency management has dominated thinking on emer-
gency management (see Rintakoski and Alho 2008) but has 
been losing some of its popularity as management theory has 
emphasized the value of more collaborative approaches (i.e., 
Comfort 2007; Moynihan 2005; Waugh and Streib 2006). 
The command and control model can be traced back to the 
highly ordered and rational management of Taylor (1911) 
with the emphasis on a mode of organization in a hierarchical 
manner to control activities. This article challenges this 
underpinning thinking by arguing that there is also a role for 
collaboration and consensus on some areas of emergency 
management. To assist in differentiating between the com-
mand and control and collaborative management approach, 
Table 2 provides a short summary of the principal differ-
ences between each management approach. The command 
and control approach that was most frequently employed 
resulted in a militaristic mode of emergency management, 
perhaps because of the need to provide a top–down planning 
approach where a named person is responsible for leading 
the emergency response rapidly. The collaborative approach 
suggests a relative move from a top–down to a bottom–up 
approach, incorporating a more dynamic and flexible net-
work that enhances collaboration between and among public 
and private organizations as the emergency unfolds. This 
means smaller organizations and communities may not only 
be involved in operational issues but also taking part in deci-
sion making (Waugh 2003) as the etiology of the emergency 
begins to unfold and be understood as a dynamic phenome-
non. Mandell and Keast (2007) suggest that collaboration 
and sharing leadership and resources may be a better 
approach given that emergencies develop their own life and 
pathway.
The argument put forward in favor of collaboration tends 
to be based on the recognition that national emergencies 
occur in what is essentially an “open system” where events 
are exposed to a myriad of causes and consequences and 
where authority is shared, responsibility is dispersed, and 
resources scattered. Under such circumstances, a pure com-
mand and control approach is neither efficient nor effective 
in accessing these resources. Patton (2007) focuses on the 
positive outcomes of collaboration by arguing that social 
relationships can significantly increase the speed of collab-
orative decision making. However, these views are chal-
lenged by Kapucu, Arslan, and Demiroz (2010), who suggest 
that a collaborative approach may not be suitable when speed 
Table 2. Summary of Command and Control versus 
Collaborative Approaches to Emergency Management.
Command and Control 
Characteristics Collaborative Characteristics
Exercise of power via 
authority by a single 
commander over 
subordinates
Power shared and the team is 
at its most powerful through 
consensus
Focus of the leader on 
planning, directing, 
coordinating, and 
determining roles, 
responsibilities and 
relationships; reliance upon 
the leader to find solutions 
or personnel to solve 
immediate problems
Model draws upon the 
transferrable skills of the team 
to facilitate interaction through 
engagement with the tasks 
in hand as well as problem 
solving as the issues arise in an 
emergency through collective 
experience
Militaristic and traditional 
management model for 
organizations that is 
dependent entirely on 
the characteristics of the 
leader to inspire the efforts 
of the subordinates
Team building and consensual 
management with collective 
effort and based on sharing 
knowledge and information
Source: Rintakoski et al. (2008); various sources.
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is of essence to kick-start a relief effort, where there is a need 
for rapid, clear, and authoritative decision making. Yet, 
Kapucu (2006) also argues in favor of a shared responsibility 
suggesting that the emergency management network needs 
to retain its connectivity, making sure that information flows 
continue and suggesting a hierarchy and a command and 
control approach. Moynihan (2005) recognizes that in spite 
of the support for collaboration, there might still be a role for 
a command and control approach with respect to successful 
emergency management, in an adaptable format (Rintakoski 
and Alho 2008). Moynihan (2008) and Waugh and Streib 
(2006) argue that a hybrid of collaboration and command 
and control would be more successful than adopting just one 
of these approaches.
Comfort (2007) and Selves (2008) highlight the impor-
tance of cognition, communication, flexibility, and innova-
tive thinking, as opposed to a command and control approach 
to accommodate the unfolding etiology of the emergency. 
The challenge to all of these arguments may, to some extent, 
depend on the relevant factors one emphasizes in the debate, 
such as the circumstances of the emergency situation, the 
specific vertical and horizontal organizational structure of 
the public and private sectors, access to resources for emer-
gency management and, last but not least, the culture of the 
affected area. Collaboration may be more difficult to achieve 
in an international or multicultural context, where there are 
large numbers of stakeholders, each with different sets of 
interest as sometimes exists with international aid agencies/
NGOs and relief efforts structured around a common human-
itarian focus. Even if the cultures were homogeneous, 
humans are not always rational and their irrationality may be 
expected to increase in times of stress, pressure, and uncer-
tainty. Fear of the unknown (such as during an emergency) 
can be a breeding ground for irrationality, and irrationality is 
not a sound platform for decision making. The more partners 
there are in any emergency setting, the more the advantages 
of enhanced capability through collaboration may be tem-
pered by the increasing complexities, especially with respect 
to communication and coordination. Waugh (2003) suggests 
that collaboration can reduce the risks associated with han-
dling a disaster situation when local capabilities might not be 
able to cope and, thus, there is undoubtedly a need for 
national emergency management.
Thus, while the literature may provide a sound argument 
for a joint/collaborative effort when implementing national 
emergency management, it does not help identify, within that 
collaboration, which stakeholders should be responsible for 
specific activities. If it is not possible to attribute responsi-
bilities, then emergency management may be inefficient 
(especially at a national scale), ineffective, or even chaotic, 
so that any response becomes stilted. When looking at the 
core activities of national emergency management (as dis-
cussed earlier with reference to Petak 1985), it may be pos-
sible to identify some activities being clearly the responsibility 
of the government (public sector responsibilities), some 
where the responsibility lies within the bailiwick of private 
sector entities (private sector responsibilities) and some 
activities where the responsibility should be shared. The next 
section examines whether it is feasible, within a complex 
system, to create a framework that allocates responsibilities 
according to the shared perceptions of the stakeholders 
engaged in national emergency management when respond-
ing to a disaster.
Complexity and Modeling in Emergency 
Management
Waugh and Streib (2006) refer to modern emergency man-
agement as being paradoxical. This is because there is pres-
sure to plan and be prepared, yet disasters are impulsive and 
unpredictable and rarely unfold in the way in which planners 
conceive. Therefore, emergency managers have to be flexi-
ble, adaptive, and innovative, regardless of the planning pro-
cesses with which they engage. The argument that 
complexities increase in emergency environments (Coskun 
and Ozceylan 2011) is compelling, and the literature has 
linked the relevance of complexity theory to emergency 
management for disasters (Gilpin and Murphy 2008; Hilhorst 
2003; Ramalingam 2013). The literature has highlighted key 
concepts, such as intergovernmental crisis planning as a 
complex adaptive system (Comfort, Boin and Demchak 
2008) or emergent human behavior during crises (Provitolo, 
Dubos-Paillard, and Muller 2011). This latter area draws 
upon what Hayek (1967) referred to as systems based on 
organized complexity. The term “organized complexity” 
(referred to as complex systems in this discussion) embodies 
a multitude of concepts that involves “dealing simultane-
ously with a sizeable number of factors that are interrelated 
into an organic whole” (Hayek 1967, 69). One of the main 
issues for this type of system is the degree of explanation that 
arises in an emergency, where thinking and response times 
are critical and reflection is a luxury that is often a function 
of hindsight. The use of a command and control or collabora-
tive approach is largely bound up in the theoretical perspec-
tive adopted by emergency planners and management 
structures that they employ and the former tends to be a tra-
ditional management model where cause and effect are 
closely correlated in their views of how to manage in an 
emergency.
Within social science, complex systems challenge 
Taylorist (1911) management views of the world, whereby a 
scientific planning approach leads to the possibility of a clear 
outcome from a plan, a feature that is often embodied in 
command and control approaches, with order being brought 
to chaotic situations. Over four decades ago, Churchman 
(1967) and Rittle and Webber (1973) suggested that the 
search to scientifically solve problems within social science 
will inevitably fail because they are “wicked” problems as 
opposed to the “tame” problems within science. In this sense, 
a tame problem is one that can be solved in a linear fashion, 
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a mathematical example of this could be solving an equation, 
where the mission is clear and one would know if the equa-
tion has been solved. In contrast, wicked problems lack clar-
ity and goals and so are either unknown or ambiguous (like 
an emergency or crisis). Wicked problems rely on a number 
of “elusive political judgments” as Rittle and Webber (1973, 
160) posit. In other words, the classical paradigm of science 
and engineering is not applicable to open societal systems 
because the theory is inadequate to help us understand or 
predict the outcomes. The complexity of objectives, shrouded 
by the complexity of politics, makes it almost impossible to 
examine unitary aims in open systems. Snowden (2005) sug-
gests that complex problems question the “probity of order.” 
In the Taylorist (1911) world of scientific management, 
everything should be explainable, but even within sciences, 
the discovery of a new law is quite a rarity. Essentially 
because of the cognitive limitations of the human brain, one 
is not able to see the outcome of a complex system and fully 
understand it.
These arguments are supported by critical realism (Sayer 
1984; Yeung 1997; de Roo, Hillier, and Van Wezemael 2012) 
which argues that inherent limitations in the ability of the 
human brain make it difficult to understand all outcomes, so 
we have a filtered knowledge upon which to make decisions. 
Hayek argued that because one does not know the law, one 
cannot predict the outcome (Chettiparamb 2013; Gilpin and 
Murphy 2008; Sayer 1984; Yeung 1997), and because in 
practice it might be impossible to test all possible combina-
tions of factors involved, the observation of complex facts 
will not lead to the invention of new hypotheses from which 
one can predict outcomes. Deleuze and Parnet (2002) add a 
further twist to this debate, by arguing that complexities exist 
because of the alternating relationships between entities 
(e.g., variables and individuals). They challenge an essential 
theory of relations. Relations are not part of “things”; instead, 
they come into play as a result of practice. Relations change 
while entities remain the same. Kwa (2002) suggested that 
even if patterns exist in such systems, they are short-term and 
not sustainable, and elements can form many different types 
of relationships. Thus, in the context of management, social 
interactions challenge outcomes and relationships combine 
politics and power (Hiller 2012). Their view implies that we 
may get an insufficient response in emergency planning by 
assuming linear relationships and we need more informed 
and judgmental forms of decision making, that go beyond 
the known and more well-known approaches used in social 
science. Lin and Song (2015) argued that there are four nor-
mal methods of seeking to understand a future situation (i.e., 
a wicked problem such as an emergency); these involve ask-
ing stakeholders, asking experts (using approaches such as 
the Delphi technique), and asking the public through surveys 
and judgment-aided methods such as scenario writing.
Hayek (1967) argued that it was possible to reverse engi-
neer complex situations, drawing from practice in pure sci-
ence. This means proceeding from deduction, instead of 
from hypothesis to deduction, proceeding from the known to 
the unknown using judgmental methods, a practice that is 
perhaps most widely used in scenario planning, where the 
future is uncertain and unpredictable. In the context of emer-
gency management, there are three types of future we need to 
understand: what may happen (possible futures), what is 
likely to happen (probable futures), and what we would pre-
fer to happen (preferable futures). The move from deduction 
means we may approach a given problem, such as a future 
event, by selecting elements relating to what is known about 
that event and then determining whether the factors selected 
are sufficiently present and relevant to the event that one is 
attempting to explain. Essentially, this is what we describe as 
a “building-blocks plan” (Kim 2014) for handling national 
emergencies.
The explanation of principles (Sommerhoff 1950) might 
yield an easier way of explaining what Hayek argued as 
going from the known to the unknown, which is why futur-
ing techniques like building scenarios and using judgmental 
research methods, may help understand the intricacies of 
how to manage the etiology of an emergency. These research 
methods neither aim for prediction of specific events, nor are 
hypothesis-based, which has to be confirmed or rejected. 
However, it does define a range of possibilities where some 
are permitted and some are forbidden, in much the same way 
within scenario planning exercises, where specific rules are 
introduced. One of the challenges in using such research 
methods is that while one might be able to explain some of 
the outcomes, the task of establishing whether or not these 
outcomes are the result of the operation of certain inputs is 
more challenging. This is because of the simultaneity of 
observable and/or unobservable variables involved.
With this discussion in mind and given no one single 
agent ever has full control during emergencies, this study 
employs a Delphi technique to seek the views of a group of 
experts, using their combined accumulated knowledge on 
managing emergencies, in relation to the challenges and the 
attribution of responsibility. The purpose was to construct a 
holistic view that is often used in systems thinking. This 
study adopts a systematic approach to the views of emer-
gency management in tourism, moving beyond the limita-
tions of individual case studies and the reflective insights 
often derived from such research methods, to adopt a global 
multistakeholder approach to derive an understanding of 
emergency management and its application to tourism. The 
prime reasoning for this approach was to adopt a more 
dynamic framework across different organizations and coun-
tries to understand the consensual factors at work, as well as 
the differences that exist between various types of stakehold-
ers in different settings.
Methodology
Disasters, by their very nature can never be accurately or com-
pletely known, and most expert and emergency managers reject 
Morakabati et al. 305
the idea of a single most likely scenario in the future (Rikkonen, 
Kaivo-oja, and Aakkula 2006). For this reason, it was decided 
to use a research method that draws upon the knowledge and 
judgment of experts. In this case, a Delphi-Scenario Technique 
was the most suitable approach to derive expert opinion, glob-
ally, from a diverse range of stakeholders. The major method-
ological contribution in this article is in the combination of 
scenario planning (see Orchiston 2012; Page and Yeoman 
2007; Page et al. 2006; Page et al. 2010; Yeoman, Lennon, and 
Black 2005; Yeoman et al. 2007 for the application to tourism), 
with the Delphi Technique as a relatively novel way to bring 
together the consideration of possible futures (i.e., from sce-
nario planning1) with a greater degree of plausibility from 
stakeholder views through the Delphi technique. The Delphi 
technique is described by Ng (1984, 48) as a “systematic utili-
sation of the judgement of experts [that] aims to obtain consen-
sus among judges on informed prediction of future events,” 
which in this case is the behavior and response to a specific 
crisis-related scenario to understand the most suitable model 
for managing such an event. Among the key characteristics of 
the Delphi approach outlined by Lin and Song (2015, 305) are 
the “anonymity of responses, the iterative nature of the process, 
controlled feedback, convergence in the distribution of opin-
ions as a consequence of information and a statistical group 
response.” There remains considerable debate over the use of 
the Delphi technique such as the identification of panel mem-
bers with the knowledge and expertise, how much iteration to 
use (which can typically range from 1 to 4 rounds often depend-
ing on the resources available), and how far it is possible to 
achieve consensus. One of the main challenges is the fact that 
response rates drop with the passing of each round and consen-
sus building will rely on less responses in a later round than 
they were in the earlier rounds. However, it has been widely 
used within tourism research for a long period of time (e.g., see 
a review by Green et al. 1990) and most recently, it was used to 
assess the future challenges to tourism in a global setting, much 
along the lines of this study (see von Bergner and Lohmann 
2014). A number of emergency management studies have 
employed the Delphi technique (e.g., Alexander 2002; 
Hurworth 2005; O’Connor 2007) specifically for tourism and 
risk studies. This study employs the Delphi technique to iden-
tify the challenges that face different stakeholders when han-
dling a natural disaster and to identify who is responsible for 
managing such a situation.
Survey Design and Procedure
The survey targeted 534 key individuals, in part provided by 
the UNWTO, who were invited to participate as Delphi panel 
members (see Figure 1). The database was constructed by the 
researchers and through the interaction, at a senior level, by the 
UNWTO with governments and other bodies. The individuals 
represented senior professionals from a wide cross section of 
industry sectors (airlines, airports, tour operators, hotels, cruise 
ships, tourism ministries, civil protection agencies, cabinet 
offices, university academics, and relevant consultancies) 
across all continents. In order to increase response rates, an 
e-mail was sent by UNWTO, to participants explaining the 
importance of their participation and inviting their responses.
Of the 534 people contacted, 195 agreed to participate and 
their sector and location details were analyzed to ensure that 
the distribution still had representative integrity, by sector, 
country, and continent. A pilot survey led to refining a num-
ber of statements on the survey instrument and some addi-
tions. An e-mail with a link to the online survey was then 
sent to each individual on July 2011 in order to maintain ano-
nymity. From the first round, there were 123 responses,2 
from 34 countries, ranging from low to high income and 
across all continents (see Table 3).
The sample was dominated by responses from Europe 
(58.5%) and Oceania (15.3%), although smaller numbers of 
representatives were available from most other regions of the 
world (e.g., South America, North America, East and Central 
Asia, East Africa, South Asia), and only three respondents 
did not provide full details. Two organizations were global in 
their remit, so their unique status meant they could not be 
allocated to one specific region.
To add a degree of realism, the study used a scenario and 
included 18 linguistic variables3 relating to it (to focus attention 
on how to respond in an emergency) as well as demographic 
questions such as the respondent’s details and sector in which 
they worked. Respondents were presented with a COBRA-
type scenario (see Seymour and Moore 2000)4 or the “victim” 
type scenario according to Coombs (2004).5 The scenario was 
designed to focus on a natural disaster and respondents were 
asked to respond to one situation as outlined in Table 4. 
However, the focus of this article is on the survey component 
and how the respondents assessed the management issues.
The 18 linguistic variables (see Table 5) used were based 
on emergency-related activities, and respondents were asked 
to identify who should take responsibility for each. We 
defined a consensus as being reached using the interquartile 
deviation (IQD). Where a difference equal to 1 or less 
between the 25th and 75th percentiles was achieved, it was 
deemed to be a consensus (Raskin 1994). However, given the 
rather mechanical nature of IQDs, and the ordinal nature of 
the variables being considered, the distribution of responses 
on their own merits was also taken into account as a way of 
establishing when a consensus was achieved.
Findings
After the first round of the Delphi data collection, half of the 
statements had achieved the consensus threshold, leaving the 
other half (9) showing a deviation of more than 1, between 
the 25th and 75th percentiles (3, 4, 5, 1.8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 
and 17). These 9 questions were then asked again in the sec-
ond round of the Delphi to try and reach a possible consen-
sus. The second round took place on November 15, 2011, 
and the survey closed on December 16, 2012.
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The respondents were sent an e-mail providing a brief sum-
mary of the outcome from the first round, and a link for the 
second round. Following the second round of responses, the 
IQD deviation was more than 1 on only four remaining ques-
tions (4, 14, 15, 17); despite this, the distribution of responses 
showed strong support for a consensus in those four.
Analysis
The descriptive statistics show that out of a total of 123 com-
pleted responses 61.7% were from the public sector compared 
with 38.3% from private sector respondents. In terms of the 
economic status of the destinations being considered, 78.4% 
were from respondents based in countries considered to be 
developed, 19% were based in developing countries, and 
2.6% were island states. It was interesting to note that only 
52% of all respondents (67.7% public and 31.3% private sec-
tor) agreed that national emergency management plans are in 
place in the countries in which they operate (see Table 6). The 
proportion of public sector respondents aware of national 
emergency plans could be partly related to the greater aware-
ness of emergency planning in the public sector. The majority 
(88%) of respondents agreed that during a disaster it is impor-
tant to use the resources of the travel and tourism businesses 
in order to respond effectively and, at the other end of the 
spectrum, only 21.5% agreed that the national tourism organi-
zations (private sector) were the most appropriate organiza-
tions to provide a single point of contact between national 
emergency management agencies and the travel and tourism 
industry during a major disaster (see Table 66).
There were positive Spearman correlations between staff 
knowledge and existence of national emergency planning 
(r
S
 = 0.342, p< 0.001), existence of national emergency plan-
ning and training exercise (r
S
 = 0.231, p = 0.012), and staff 
knowledge and training (r
S
 = 0.299, p = 0.01). The three 
areas are linked and hence it is not surprising that all three 
Table 3. Distribution of Types of Respondents.
Types of Organizations Percentage
Government/crisis planning organization 27.7
Tour operators 26.1
Ministries of tourism 17.6
Universities 8.4
Airlines 5.9
Consultancies 4.2
Airports 4.2
Tourism associations 3.4
Hotels 2.5
Figure 1. The Delphi process.
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were correlated, but one might have expected the correlation 
coefficients to be higher. Overall, these results provide suf-
ficient confidence levels to move on and build the Table Top 
exercise. This is because there was enough awareness among 
the respondents regarding the importance of disaster proce-
dures, so awareness raising was not necessary in this instance.
As the primary objective of this study was to allocate 
responsibilities, respondents were required to identify with 
whom the main responsibilities should lay for each activity 
listed in the 18 linguistics variables (see Table 5). The 5-point 
Likert-type scale for the linguistic variables was collapsed 
into three to identify (1) private sector responsibility only; 
(2) shared responsibility, to varying degrees; and (3) public 
sector responsibility only. The logic of collapsing the scale 
being based on the fact that it was important to identify 
which activities should be carried out by “both” private and 
public sector organizations and which were private or public 
sector only. Interestingly, by collapsing the responses down 
to three categories, the results closely matched those derived 
from the IQD results. This analysis shows a strong central 
tendency, suggesting that the majority of respondents feel 
that there is scope for collaborative responsibilities for the 
majority of activities (see Table 7), with the exception of 
tourists confirmed dead, which was felt to be a public sector 
responsibility compared to tourist search, coordination, com-
munication, and repatriation.
As the data were collected from both public and private 
sectors, it was important to assess if there was a different 
perception toward allocating responsibilities between the 
two sets of respondents. Therefore, respondents were sepa-
rated into two groups, public or private sector, and a Mann–
Whitney (MW) test was used to test the equality of the 
median of responses according to group. These are all 
responsibilities, which showed differences between public 
and private sector responses.
Table 4. The Two Scenarios.
Scenario A
It is the main tourist season and an earthquake measuring 8.4 
on the Richter scale is recorded with its epicenter close to 
the main tourist area of the country in which you operate. 
The information you are receiving is scant and lacking detail. In 
particular, we still do not have reliable estimates of casualties 
and destruction. However, you do receive reports indicating that 
the event is serious with deaths reported and significant damage 
to infrastructure and superstructure. You also are led to believe 
that some tourists are included amongst the casualties. You 
have 1,340 customers/tourists in the immediate vicinity plus a 
further 480 customers/tourists who are scattered throughout the 
country in remote rural areas.
The main airport remains open with limited services available; 
many highways and arterial roads are closed as a result of 
earthquake damage. Power supplies have been interrupted and 
fires, gas leaks and local flooding are prevalent. Reports are 
coming in of frequent aftershocks ranging from 4.2 to 5.6 making 
rescue attempts difficult.
Scenario B
A tourism destination in which you are located/operate has 
received a weather forecast that suggests that a severe and 
large tropical Cyclone/Hurricane with wind speeds of up to 240 
kilometers per hour is heading in that direction. The system is 
expected to reach the coastal areas sometime within the next 
48 hours, combining with high tide creating a significant storm 
surge and major flooding to all low-lying areas. The high winds 
are expected to cause considerable damage to properties. It is 
peak tourist season and hotels are running at near full capacity, 
and there are an estimated 3,500 tourists directly in the path of 
the cyclone and a further 1,350 tourists located in more rural 
areas in and around the coastal region. The high winds and floods 
are expected to close the international airport within the next 16 
to 18 hours and the main arterial roads to and from the region 
are blocked as a result of flooding from recent rain and the 
evacuating population. The power supplies have been intermittent 
as the high winds have brought down cables.
Table 5. The 18 Linguistic Questions in the Delphi Exercise.
1.  Immediately contact 
tourists in the affected area
10.  Contact and liaise with families 
of own affected staff
2.  Arrange travel to 
repatriate tourists from 
affected area
11.  Set up emergency operations 
room & crisis planning team (in 
country/at headquarters)
3.  Liaise with hospitals and 
medical centers where 
tourists have been taken
12.  Regularly update key 
stakeholders, the media, wider 
stakeholders
4.  Liaise with embassies 
of affected tourists to 
assist in identification and 
repatriation
13.  Provide regular information 
updates to tourists
5.  Arrange alternative 
emergency 
accommodation for all 
affected tourists
14.  Establish public information call 
center for tourists’ friends and 
relatives
6.  Assist during a post-crisis/
disaster investigation by 
coordinating input from 
travel and tourism agencies
15.  Identification of tourists 
confirmed missing
7.  Coordinate the use of 
any resources (private 
and public) by national 
emergency services (e.g., 
transport)
16.  Identification of tourists 
confirmed dead
8.  Manage internal HR issues 
to ensure continuing 
ability to respond—
resilience
17.  Liaise with religious/faith 
organizations
9.  Assess impact of scenario 
on destination’s ability to 
perform—reputation
18.  Financial assistance 
arrangements for affected 
tourists
Note: Private = 1; private more than public = 2; both equally = 3; public 
more than private = 4; public = 5. (the private sector: national tourist 
associations, airlines, hotels and hotel associations, tour operators, etc.; 
the public sector: ministries such as tourism, foreign affairs, health and 
internal affairs; national, regional, and local emergency services/agencies 
and tourism authorities).
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Private sector respondents view the public sector as being 
more responsible for assessing the destination’s ability to 
perform emergency management tasks. In other words, des-
tination business continuity was seen as an activity for the 
public sector to lead on, with their holistic understanding of 
how to keep the destination operating. Similar results exist 
for communicating information, where private sector respon-
dents attributed responsibility to the public sector, with their 
public relations and marketing functions with the global 
media to provide a consistent message on behalf of all stake-
holders. While all respondents agreed that the identification 
of dead tourists was a public sector responsibility indicating 
an underlying responsibility for visitors.
The level of economic development might influence 
respondents’ allocation of responsibilities to the public or 
private sector because developing countries may not have an 
abundance of large companies that could take responsibility 
for emergency management activities, and if they do they 
may well be foreign-owned companies. Therefore, the level 
of privatization and foreign direct investment could impact 
upon the allocation of responsibility. Respondent’s countries 
were divided into three groups: developing, developed, and 
small island developing states (SIDS). However, given the 
small sample of SIDS respondents, it was decided to look at 
just two groups, developed and developing countries. MW 
tests were run to test the significant differences in the sam-
ple. The results suggest that those from developing econo-
mies allocated more responsibilities to the public sector than 
those from developed economies, supporting the view 
expressed above and underlining the lack of private sector 
infrastructure and resources in these developing status 
destinations.
Table 7. Allocation of Responsibilities in Emergency 
Management: Who Should Be Responsible for What Functions?
Private Both Public
Identification of tourists 
confirmed dead
0.8 37.5 61.7
Identification of tourists 
confirmed missing
0.8 49.2 50.0
Coordinate the use of any 
resources (private and public) 
by national emergency services 
(e.g., transport)
0.8 51.3 47.9
Liaise with religious/faith 
organizations
1.7 62.8 35.5
Establish public information call 
center for tourists’ friends and 
relatives
3.3 64.2 32.5
Set up emergency operations 
room and crisis management 
team (in country/at 
headquarters)
7.6 70.6 21.8
Regularly update key 
stakeholders, the media, wider 
stakeholders
5.0 71.7 23.3
Liaise with embassies of affected 
tourists to assist in identification 
and repatriation
0.8 72.5 26.7
Manage internal HR issues to 
ensure continuing ability to 
respond—Resilience
16.0 74.8 9.2
Arrange alternative emergency 
accommodation for all affected 
tourists
7.5 85.8 6.7
Provide regular information 
updates to tourists
3.4 86.3 9.4
Immediately contact tourists in 
the affected area
5.8 90.9 3.3
Arrange travel to repatriate 
tourists from affected area
5.8 91.7 2.5
Table 6. Respondents’ Attitudes to Emergency Management.
Percentage of 
Agreement Mean
During a crisis, it is important to 
use the resources of the travel 
and tourism businesses in order to 
respond effectively.
88.1 4.10
Our staff know whom to contact at 
the national regional and local levels 
when seeking to coordinate disaster 
management responses during a 
crisis.
56.9 3.50
National emergency management 
plans are in place in the country(ies) 
in which we operate
52.1 3.54
National tourist organizations (public 
sector) are the most appropriate 
organizations to provide a single 
point of contact between national 
emergency management agencies 
and the travel and tourism industry 
during a major crisis
47.9 3.36
I have not seen the national 
emergency plans for the 
country(ies) in which I operate
43.9 3.05
We regularly run crisis simulation 
exercises involving the participation 
of emergency services public sector 
and the private sector
39.8 3.05
The majority of tourism businesses 
in the country(ies) in which we 
operate are too small to have the 
skill sets or time to deal with crisis 
planning
32.2 2.70
National tourist associations (private 
sector) are the most appropriate 
organizations to provide a single 
point of contact between national 
emergency management agencies 
and the travel and tourism industry 
during a major crisis
21.5 2.70
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The analysis shows that there are differences between the 
activities being allocated to public and private sectors. The 
process leading to the 18-item questionnaire was structured 
by the intention of measuring four conceptual entities (iden-
tification, coordination, tourism support, and communica-
tion), which were too amorphous to approach directly. A 
Cronbach’s alpha test was employed to ensure the reliability 
of the index for overall risk perceptions. The Cronbach’s 
alpha over all of the risk questions was 0.812, and it was 
noted that deleting one of the questions did not significantly 
improve the alpha score. To establish if these four conceptual 
entities could be retrieved as latent variables (factors) from 
the responses, principal component analysis (PCA)7 was 
undertaken. In doing so, five variables (3, 5, 9, 10, 18; see 
Table 2) were eliminated because their communalities load-
ing were lower than 0.5. The correlation coefficients were 
then examined to ensure there were variables with a correla-
tion higher than 0.3, MSA = 0.728 > 0.05. This is because if 
the relationships between the variables are weak, PCA will 
not help to reduce the data. Bartlett’s test examines if the null 
hypothesis that the original correlation matrix is an identity 
matrix. If the p value is significant (p < 0.05), it tells us that 
the R matrix is not an identity matrix, and so there are some 
relationships between variables that we would like to include 
in the analysis. The p value associated with the Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity was determined to see if it was smaller than 
0.05 (p=0.0001). The eigenvalues related with each factor 
indicate the variance explained by that particular linear com-
ponent (Field 2005). SPSS then extracts all factors with an 
eigenvalue of more than 1, which generated four factors as 
shown in Table 8.
Table 9 shows the rotated component matrix. It is worth 
mentioning that the rotated matrix distributed the variance 
reasonably equitably among the factors; so they can now be 
taken as of roughly equal importance. In a rotated compo-
nent matrix, to help with data interpretation, the absolute 
values less than 0.4 were suppressed, although it is merely an 
instruction to print values >0.4 to the output file (Field 2003). 
The rotated component matrix extracted four components 
(see Table 9). This matrix contains the loadings of each vari-
able onto each factor. Both observation of the eigenvalues 
and factor loading in the rotated component matrix have led 
to the identification of four distinct components in this 
matrix. Table 9 shows the factor matrix for the four-factor 
rotated matrix; each factor accounts for about 16% of the 
variance explained by this model. Only those factor loadings 
greater than 0.4 are shown, to emphasize the variables con-
tributing most to the interpretation of each factor.
The components extracted can be summarized as 
follows:
•• Component 1 is labeled as identification activities that 
are concerned with locating people after an 
emergency;
•• Component 2 can be identified as being focused on 
coordination activities;
•• Component 3 is labeled tourism support activities; 
and
•• Component 4 is focused on the theme of information 
(communication) activities.
This reinforces the broad findings, with the exception of 
statement 13, which created some noise in the data. The load-
ing is relatively strong in two factors, instead of the remain-
ing factors, which group into a single component, with the 
majority loading more than 0.6.
Figure 2 is a three-dimensional graph of the factor results, 
and each axis represents the level of agreement between par-
ticipants on the allocation of responsibility (public, private, 
shared) for each of the 13 variables included in the four fac-
tors of the PCA. The 13 small symbols are the 13 variables, 
coded to identify the factor they are most strongly associated 
Table 8. Total Variance Explained in the Components.
Component
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
 1 3.680 28.308 28.308 3.680 28.308 28.308 2.127 16.361 16.361
 2 2.010 15.464 43.772 2.010 15.464 43.772 2.120 16.306 32.666
 3 1.420 10.922 54.694 1.420 10.922 54.694 2.092 16.089 48.755
 4 1.137 8.747 63.441 1.137 8.747 63.441 1.909 14.686 63.441
 5 0.842 6.480 69.921  
 6 0.732 5.627 75.548  
 7 0.637 4.901 80.449  
 8 0.588 4.524 84.973  
 9 0.535 4.118 89.090  
10 0.457 3.516 92.607  
11 0.400 3.075 95.682  
12 0.342 2.627 98.309  
13 0.220 1.691 100.000  
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with. The four larger symbols represent the interparticipant 
responsibility type averaged over within-factor variables.
Figure 2 suggests that there are four distinct groups of 
responsibilities based on the allocation of responsibility to 
the private sector, shared responsibilities, and the public sec-
tor agencies. While tourist identification clearly falls within 
the remit of the public sector, the coordination and informa-
tion (communication) clearly sits as a shared responsibility, 
Table 9. Rotated Component Matrix.a
Component
 1 2 3 4
 1.  Immediately contact tourists in the affected area .739  
 2.  Arrange travel to repatriate tourists from affected areas .830  
 4.  Liaise with embassies of affected tourists to assist in identification and repatriation .502  
 5.  Arrange alternative emergency accommodation for all affected tourists .760  
 7.   Coordinate the use of any resources (private and public) by national emergency services (e.g., 
transport)
.725  
 8.  Manage internal HR issues to ensure continuing ability to respond—resilience .831  
11.   Set up emergency operations room and crisis planning team (in country/at headquarters) .693  
12.  Regularly update key stakeholders, the media, wider stakeholders .702  
13.  Provide regular information updates to tourists .404 .610
14.  Establish public information call center for tourists’ friends and relatives .718
15.a.  Identification of tourists confirmed missing .784  
16.a.  Identification of tourists confirmed dead .836  
17.  Liaise with religious/faith organizations .672
Note: Extraction method: principal component analysis; rotation method: varimax with Kaiser normalization.
Figure 2. Allocation of responsibilities by each component.
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with information sharing also seen as being more a public 
sector responsibility compared with coordination. Tourism 
support was found to be relatively aligned toward the private 
sector.
Summary of Findings, Discussion, and 
Implications
Earlier in this article, a number of key studies posited the 
case for collaboration in emergency management (i.e., 
Comfort 2007; UNISDR 2005; Kapucu 2006; Moynihan 
2005; Patton 2007; Smith 2012; Waugh 2003; Waugh and 
Streib 2006), although these studies do not map to the alloca-
tion of responsibilities, particularly when tourism is one of 
the stakeholders. The argument presented from a theoretical 
perspective is that we need to focus on explaining the prin-
ciples for (see Hayek 1967) emergency management rather 
than on detailed planning measures. Then, through the use of 
a building-block approach (see, e.g., Kim 2014; Overy 1993; 
Perry 2004), we set up a Table Top exercise in order to allo-
cate the responsibilities, having designed a COBRA scenario 
(see Table 4) in a relatively simple form using the Delphi 
approach.
Within Table 5, a total of 18 responsibilities were exam-
ined to see if there was a different perception toward allocat-
ing responsibilities between agents in the public and private 
sectors. The outcome suggested that only in three areas were 
there differences between them. In terms of the impact of the 
scenario on the destination, the role of constructing and dis-
seminating information to tourists and the private sector is 
perceived to be a public sector responsibility. On the other 
hand, the public sector perceived the role of identifying tour-
ists confirmed missing as mainly their own responsibility. 
Overall differences in all three statements proposed that 
more responsibility should be perceived to be the public 
sector’s.
Some 18 responsibilities were assessed in relation to the 
respondents’ locations, but there was disagreement in two 
statements where developing counties saw responsibility for 
the repatriation of tourists and coordination of resources as a 
public sector responsibility. These findings emphasize that 
there are very few differences between the stakeholders in 
relation to the allocation of responsibilities. However, this is 
not a universal view, because the resource base of developing 
countries suggests a greater dependence on the public sector, 
which, under such circumstances, is perceived as the lead 
organization having access to resources. Contingency theory 
(see Fielder 1964) suggests that things change, and different 
environments (i.e., different cultures among stakeholders) 
place various requirements on an organization. Emergencies 
create a situation of increased uncertainty and, for example, in 
a high uncertainty avoidance culture, a collaborative commu-
nication approach might fail (Guirdham 2011). It is unrealistic 
to have a one-size-fits-all management model for countries 
with different political, organizational, and geographical 
boundaries (i.e., a country comprising multiple islands vs. a 
land-locked country). Different countries are likely to have 
various solutions to the allocation of responsibility for han-
dling tourists and tourism within a wider national emergency 
management response framework. Some governments have 
included such a responsibility within the overall remit of the 
national emergency management agency or ministry. Others 
may allocate the responsibility within the remit of the Police 
or Civil Protection agencies.
In addition and perhaps more importantly, despite agree-
ment on the principle of how both public and private sector 
agents would translate this agreement into action, in reality it 
could only be seen in a live exercise or real situation. 
Different bodies have different agendas, which could affect 
this initial agreement. Despite this, an average of 71% of the 
respondents felt a collaborative approach to be appropriate 
while allocating more weight toward public sector responsi-
bility. That is a seed change from command and control to a 
more flexible collaborative approach (Comfort 2007; Selves, 
2008). Therefore, the analysis moved on to create the model 
on the basis of the overall allocation of responsibilities, as 
there were few differences between private and public sec-
tors. The outcome of the PCA (see Table 9) shows that there 
were four dimensions: identification, coordination, commu-
nication, and tourism support. Responsibilities were allo-
cated to these dimensions on the basis of the level of 
agreement among the participants and between the private 
and public sector agents, and the results are shown in a three-
dimensional pattern (see Figure 2). Tourism identification 
was clearly associated with the public sector, coordination 
and information was seen to be a shared responsibility, with 
information leaning more toward the public sector and tour-
ism support in the hands of the private sector as part of this 
Table Top exercise.
The literature suggests that emergency management 
shares its characteristics with complex systems, with the 
degree of explanation scarce in general and solutions often 
seen in hindsight. In this sense, the prediction of the entire 
outcome seems challenging (de Roo et al. 2012; Sayer 1984; 
Snowden 2005; Yeung 1997) as the problems themselves 
often lack clarity. At the same time, business continuity for 
both public and private sectors requires planning for the 
unexpected (Petak 1985), which makes detailed planning a 
fluid and ever-changing notion. In contrast, some researchers 
(e.g., Israeli and Reichel 2003; Mansfeld 1999; Okumus and 
Karamustafa 2005) suggest that a more proactive approach 
to emergency management is necessary while arguing that 
almost nothing can be learned from one disaster to another 
(Mansfeld 1999). Of course, one could be prepared for par-
ticular types of emergencies (e.g., London 7/7 July) that 
could partly be a matter of good fortune where a team is pre-
pared for an emergency situation that actually happens. 
Building an approach that one could apply to different types 
of emergencies means that one has to go from the known to 
the unknown for the explanation of principles as advocated 
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by Sommerhoff (1950). This means allocating the overall 
responsibilities without predicting the outcome in advance 
and being “more flexible,” an approach also popularized by 
Comfort (2007) and Selves (2008)).
The findings illustrate a germane theme from the extant 
literature on emergency planning relating to the significance 
of shared responsibility in both coordination and information 
sharing, and the need for allocated responsibilities for part-
ners to work collaboratively, although with limitations. The 
distribution of appropriate information to the collaborating 
partners in emergencies is a complicated issue, and effective 
coordination is highly dependent on information sharing, 
which Kapucu (2006) recognizes as an ongoing problem in 
emergency management. In this sense, our solution could 
also be a problem. This assumes an even greater significance 
for international tourists, who may be in an unfamiliar local-
ity where information and knowledge of the host country is 
scarce and the media becomes the main purveyor of knowl-
edge in the absence of accurate knowledge. Within the desti-
nation, the lack of information could create duplication of 
activities (McEntire 2007), which can be time consuming, 
misleading and, at times, very costly in human, financial, and 
reputational terms. Therefore, where responsibilities are 
shared, communication between the private and public sec-
tors is a critical one where social media has given an ever-
increasing power to the public to communicate among 
themselves, requiring a speedy response from organizations 
in emergency situations.
Turning the focus to more tourism-specific challenges, 
under the scenario presented two main sets of components 
were identified; tourism identification and tourism support 
(see Table 9). Tourism identification included finding miss-
ing and dead tourists and liaising with religious faith groups 
and other agencies (i.e., the Red Cross), which are NGOs, 
and the coordination of the use of any resources. This, it is 
suggested is a public sector responsibility. Although recover-
ing bodies could take up to weeks, the rapid recovery of dead 
bodies is essential and requires expertise, including counsel-
ing services to address the psychological effects, forensic 
services to identify the condition of bodies, and confidential-
ity in handling these issues. Therefore, attributing the respon-
sibility to one sector instead of multiple sectors could speed 
up procedures and provide the necessary consistency 
(Kapucu 2010; Moynihan 2005). There is an assumption 
among emergency managers that the needs of tourists can be 
addressed in the same way as dealing with the needs of the 
local community. But in terms of international tourism, the 
visitors (both the living and those injured/deceased) need to 
be repatriated and the dead not buried, as seen in the case of 
the Mecca stampede, otherwise they get incorporated in the 
list of missing persons. Tourists’ dead bodies present further 
challenges when their families might need to visit the desti-
nation to identify bodies. Other issues such as language and 
the lack of shelter and medical infrastructure may not exist in 
areas close to where mass tourism takes place. Thus, care 
must be taken by local emergency planners to ensure that all 
citizens, including tourists and those that work in the tourism 
industry, have access to medical assistance in an emergency.
In contrast, respondents felt that tourist support, such as 
repatriation, finding alternative accommodation, and dealing 
with active living persons were more the responsibility of the 
private sector, such as airlines, hotels, and tour operators. 
These organizations often have evacuation plans prepared in 
the country from which the tourists originated (largely in 
developed nations). The recent terrorist attack in Tunisia 
shows that evacuation was heavily dependent on tour opera-
tors to repatriate visitors via flights they organized in their 
emergency plans (Killelea 2015); those who were wounded 
or dead were brought back home by military aircraft.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to allocate emergency man-
agement–related responsibilities between public and private 
sector agents, during a COBRA-type scenario where tourism 
is a major component. Using a Table Top approach, the find-
ings distinguished between those responsibilities that are 
capable of being managed in a command and control model 
and other areas that were seen to require a collaborative 
approach. These findings demonstrated more accurately 
where the allocation of responsibilities should lie while pro-
viding empirical support for the theoretical arguments of 
using building-blocks as the most effective way to create 
emergency planning models (Kim 2014). This approach 
combines a greater degree of collaboration and judgmental 
thinking to be more responsive to the etiology of emergen-
cies that have their own life cycle.
The purpose of this study was not to offer detailed plan-
ning solutions for emergency management situations. 
Instead, it adopted a more theoretical approach derived from 
the seminal study by Hayek (1967) that conceptualizes the 
journey in emergency management as one of going from the 
known to the unknown, in order to deal with the wicked 
problems (Rittle and Webber 1973; Snowden 2005) rather 
than adopting the more conventional Taylorist models. This 
illustrates the interdisciplinary contribution of management 
thinking and the need to re-evaluate how we approach the 
subject using empirical justification. Yet what such manage-
ment thinking demonstrates is that because one does not 
know the cause, one cannot know the effect in an emergency 
management setting, a Taylorist model is not necessarily the 
most suitable paradigm. Taylorist models may appear very 
rational; human beings by their very nature are susceptible to 
shocks, to varying degrees, from which irrational responses 
may emerge through fear and the irregularities of crises. This 
makes the planning process challenging, and collaboration 
presents the potential for a fluid process that ebbs and flows 
through the etiology of an emergency. The article provides a 
methodology that creates a conceptual framework, where 
countries can adapt to their own settings and situation, or at 
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least be aware of the main challenges that could help deter-
mine the allocation of responsibilities, which again are deter-
mined by the nature of the emergency.
There are limitations to this study that could, in future, be 
tested in order to see if the outcomes are similar to those 
achieved here. Popper (1957) pointed out that every genuine 
test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it. The limitations of 
this study arise from the fact that 78.4% of respondents were 
based in the developed world, and of the remaining 21.6%, 
only 2.6% were from SIDS. Given that the allocation of 
resources in the public and private sectors in the developing 
world are markedly different, it would have been better if we 
had had a larger sample, as ignoring specific challenges, par-
ticularly with respect to small islands, could limit the general 
applicability of our findings. In spite of the good response 
rate, the sampling frame was not large and therefore it may 
have affected the statistical power of the analyses. The study 
used two scenarios but only one of which was in this study; 
the outcome could have been different if the scenario set was 
different. It is advisable to road test scenarios using different 
samples of emergency managers in specific countries in 
order to test the reliability of the outcomes for any given 
destination.
To develop this strand of thinking, an important follow-up 
study would be to evaluate the nature of country-specific 
plans and the manner in which they are regularly road tested 
and challenged, by drawing on best practice across this 
emerging sector of research, as outlined by Kim (2014) in the 
UK context. For destinations with established emergency 
plans, the results help question whether those existing plans 
are robust and workable if the responsibilities are fragmented 
or if the risks of emergencies are heightened by very large 
gatherings of tourists (e.g., the Hajj stampede in 2015). This 
study used a macro approach to emergency management, 
testing, and only one type of scenario, which means that 
other forms of research on other types of scenarios, both at 
the micro and macro level, would be valuable to examine 
other implications. Furthermore, more theoretically informed 
research could examine network theories and their relation-
ship with respect to the collaboration aspects of emergencies, 
such as communication between and among stakeholders, 
where social media gives power to voluntary members of the 
media (public) and communication becomes both a problem 
and a solution. In addition, the cultural dimensions of these 
communication forms could be taken into account to see if a 
collaborative approach could be useful in every case.
Emergency planning and management is growing in sig-
nificance globally and this study emphasizes the anchor role 
of the public sector as the arbiter of tourist well-being in 
emergency situations. A command and control model may 
not necessarily be the most effective approach, given the 
breadth and scope of possible emergencies, and it needs to be 
recognized that no one individual can possibly grasp or com-
prehend or be prepared for all eventualities. Drawing 
on collective knowledge and expertise to derive intellectual 
collateral and knowledge appears to be the most effective 
model where a greater team effort can be built to allow 
greater adaptability and fluidity as emergencies unfold and 
develop.
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Notes
1. Scenario planning helps to create choices based on looking at 
alternative possibilities framed around three questions: what 
may happen (possible futures), what is likely to happen (prob-
able futures), and what we would prefer to happen (preferable 
futures).
2. The sample included in Table 3 were senior managers, with 33% 
of them female respondents. The sample included major inter-
national airlines. The airports included major hubs throughout 
Europe, the United States, and those based in the Southern 
Hemisphere. The major tour operators included companies 
responsible for a large proportion of European and American 
travelers, including more specialist tour operators as well as 
large cruise ship organizations. The emergency services and 
governments included heads of police forces, attorney gener-
als, heads of emergency management institutes, cabinet offices, 
national disaster management organisations, government for-
eign offices, a capital city resilience team, and the European 
Commission’s DG ECHO–Emergency Response Unit.
3.  A linguistic variable is one whose values are composed of words 
or phrases. In this article, a Likert scale was assigned to linguis-
tic variables, for example, Private only = 1, Private more than 
Public = 2, and so forth).
4. COBRA: This represents the type of negative event that strikes 
with little or no warning, such as the case of a terrorist attack 
or an earthquake. Thus, except for risk reduction strategies 
and disaster management planning and simulation exercises, 
there are no specific activities involved until the occurrence of 
the event. From that time forward, the activities will be either 
response orientated and/or recovery strategies.
5. Coombs (2004) proposed a crisis attribution theory based on 
attributions of responsibility.
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6. The targeted selection of participants and the participative and 
iterative nature of the process results in a sampling procedure 
that meets few of the assumptions required by the inferential 
analyses and models reported in this section. Caution must, 
therefore, be exercised in the literal interpretation of these 
results. However, the variables used in Table 6 were established 
in the first round of consensus building, and analyses involving 
them are likely to be moderately generalizable.
7. Design and sampling concerns (see PCA) are more important in 
this context, as iterative adjustments may influence patterns of 
covariance between variables repeatedly considered by partici-
pants. The analysis reported is one of three analyses that were 
carried out to estimate the importance of these concerns: first 
iteration variables, second iteration variables (the reported anal-
ysis), and variables averaged over both iterations.
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